{"id":5672,"date":"2015-07-06T14:56:17","date_gmt":"2015-07-06T13:56:17","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/?p=5672"},"modified":"2015-07-06T14:56:17","modified_gmt":"2015-07-06T13:56:17","slug":"ukraine-asymmetric-or-dissymmetric-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/?p=5672","title":{"rendered":"Ukraine, asymmetric or dissymmetric war?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_5674\" style=\"width: 590px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-5674\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"size-large wp-image-5674\" src=\"http:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/07\/80930468_ukraine_protests_v6_624map-580x387.gif\" alt=\"(Fonte: BBC)\" width=\"580\" height=\"387\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/07\/80930468_ukraine_protests_v6_624map-580x387.gif 580w, https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/07\/80930468_ukraine_protests_v6_624map-280x187.gif 280w, https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/07\/80930468_ukraine_protests_v6_624map-300x200.gif 300w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 580px) 100vw, 580px\" \/><p id=\"caption-attachment-5674\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">(Fonte: BBC)<\/p><\/div>\n<p><em>Guerra in Ucraina\u2026asimmetrie e convenzionalit\u00e0 in una guerra attuale: quel che c&#8217;\u00e8 di possibile&#8230;<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>Il Direttore scientifico: Maria Gabriella Pasqualini<\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The military operations of the \u201cgreen men\u201d and separatists in Ukraine could be described as hybrid warfare according to a series of criteria: use of regular and irregular forces, strong links with criminal groups, unclear distinction between civilians and soldiers and military activities in situations in which war is actually not declared. Such a strategy could be considered as a kind of asymmetric warfare.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><em>Asymmetric warfare <\/em>consists of two sides in a conflict which have totally different strategies, strengths and weaknesses. Both resort to different types of <em>asymmetric<\/em> tactics to achieve more advantages on the other one. <em>The weakest force such as the local pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine will try to inflict the highest economic and human costs on its more powerful adversary to\u00a0turn the conflict into a war of attrition while the strongest force (Ukraine) will limit operations because it is unable to support the increasily growing economic and human costs of the conflict. <\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Furthermore, one main aim of asymmetric warfare is to make any countermove of the stronger force, such as the current deployment of Russian &#8220;peacekeepers&#8221; on the Ukrainian soil, like a considerable and unwarranted escalation.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Asymmetrical actions include informational ones as well. Therefore the employment of media and propaganda is extremely helpful to reduce the enemy&#8217;s fighting potential, because all countries involved in wars of this type want to support and justify their operations by denying any violation of\u00a0international law. It is primarily a figurative war of narratives in which favorable ones are reinforced and multiplied while \u201cforeign\u201d interpretations are neutralized and pushed to the margins where they pose no threat.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Therefore defensive tactics would lead to defeat in this kind of war. Russia has accordingly revised its approach defining the threat in eastern Ukraine as an offensive war, therefore Russian <em>dezinformatsia <\/em>is increasing a purported anarchy in eastern Ukraine and the right of separatists to self-determination.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The opposite of asymmetric warfare is <em>dissymmetric warfare <\/em>involving massive force against a weaker opponent in a military conflict. Ukraine has both asymmetric and dissymmetric dimensions in the war in\u00a0eastern Ukraine. Pro-Russian separatists promote an asymmetric warfare against the Ukrainian government while Russia prosecutes a parallel dissymmetric one. The Ukrainian government has been unable to change the asymmetric war against pro-Russian separatists into a dissymmetric one in which the Ukraine could exploit its advantages. This reflects several factors. The separatist forces have\u00a0convincingly demonstrated a\u00a0higher &#8216;esprit de corps&#8217; than the Ukrainian\u00a0separatist forces\u00a0whose regular army units are increasingly dependent upon conscripts (Ukraine&#8217;s risky gambit to limit army units by deploying ultra-nationalist paramilitary units to front line positions). Separatist forces have also limited their actions to waging a classic asymmetric conflict that makes an optimal use of terrain and guerrilla warfare tactics.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Moreover, the dissymmetric war in eastern Ukraine is mostly a cybered conflict. Ukraine faces a determined and capable adversary, the Russian government, highly skilled in using <em>dezinformatsia <\/em>to currently impose virtual costs and virtual collateral damages on Ukraine. The large hostile use of information and communication technologies is mainly used by the Russian government to influence adversary-state&#8217;s information resources and\u00a0cause\u00a0\u00a0damage\u00a0to telecommunication systems.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">This includes promoting disinformation and virtual depictions in cyberspace misrepresenting reality with the aim of disorienting, destabilizing and demoralizing a civilian population. Disinformation, rightly used, can significantly and considerably develop a &#8220;shock and awe&#8221; effect that saps an adversary&#8217;s willingness to fight distorting how civilians perceive and understand the conflict.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The Russian cyber-supremacy has currently become the Ukraine&#8217;s second ungovernable front in which it is fighting an unconventional cybered war alongside the conventional one on the soil of eastern Ukraine.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00a9<a href=\"http:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/\">www.osservatorioanalitico.com<\/a> \u2013 Riproduzione riservata<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_5676\" style=\"width: 549px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-5676\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"size-large wp-image-5676\" src=\"http:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/07\/80930469_ukraine_crimea_russia_map_v6_624-539x405.gif\" alt=\"(Fonte: BBC)\" width=\"539\" height=\"405\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/07\/80930469_ukraine_crimea_russia_map_v6_624-539x405.gif 539w, https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/07\/80930469_ukraine_crimea_russia_map_v6_624-266x200.gif 266w, https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/07\/80930469_ukraine_crimea_russia_map_v6_624-300x225.gif 300w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 539px) 100vw, 539px\" \/><p id=\"caption-attachment-5676\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">(Fonte: BBC)<\/p><\/div>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Guerra in Ucraina\u2026asimmetrie e convenzionalit\u00e0 in una guerra attuale: quel che c&#8217;\u00e8 di possibile&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3277,"featured_media":5674,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_is_tweetstorm":false,"jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":[]},"categories":[3,1373,131,1374],"tags":[2416,2323,2324,2325,2395],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/07\/80930468_ukraine_protests_v6_624map.gif","jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p4fe9l-1tu","jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5672"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3277"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=5672"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5672\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5675,"href":"https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5672\/revisions\/5675"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/5674"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=5672"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=5672"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.osservatorioanalitico.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=5672"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}